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THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF JUDGMENTS: 
HUSSERL VS. KANT 
The present essay claims that the understanding of judgments in which they are construed 
as mental objects – as Kant appears to have believed – is mistaken and that the solution 
proposed by Husserl’s phenomenology is more satisfactory. An outline of the mentalist or 
conceptualist understanding of judgments is presented and some of the principal difficul-
ties with this view are pointed out. Then, a brief sketch of Husserl’s proposal is offered 
and it is shown how it overcomes these difficulties. According to phenomenology judg-
ments may be considered from both a subjective and an objective point of view. On the 
one hand, they are intentional activities of a cognitive agent; this is an account of their 
mode of existence in the subject. On the other hand, they are states of affairs as proposed; 
this is an account of their relationship to the world. Such an understanding of judgments 
requires as its foundation the principle of intentionality, absent in Kant, according to 
which the relationship between the mind and known objects is immediate. This principle 
may be held to be the first principle of phenomenology. 
Let us suppose that our colleague has just entered the room and said, “It’s rain-
ing cats and dogs. If we want to arrive at the lecture on time, we had better leave 
a little earlier”. Suppose that, going along with what we have been told, we say 
to ourselves, “That’s the third day of rain in a row”, and instinctively go to fetch 
our raincoat and umbrella. What is it that has taken place? It would appear that 
at the suggestion of our colleague we have formulated the judgment “it is rain-
ing” and have acted upon it. Yet what precisely is the “judgment” that we have 
entertained and how does it “refer” to the state of affairs that is perceptually 
absent from us but is believed to obtain? What sort of objects are such empirical 
judgments? How and where do they exist? Phrasing the problem in classical 
philosophical terms, what is their ontological status? 
It is the claim of the present essay that the understanding of judgments in 
which they are construed as mental objects of some sort, an understanding that is 
held, among others, by Kant, is mistaken and that the solution proposed by 




ture.1 In what follows, we shall first outline what the mentalist or conceptualist 
understanding of judgments consists of and point out some of the principal diffi-
culties with this view; next, we shall briefly sketch Husserl’s proposal and show 
how it overcomes these difficulties. 
Phenomenology considers judgments from both a subjective and an objective 
point of view. On the one hand, they are intentional activities of a cognitive 
agent; on the other hand, they are states of affairs as proposed. The first is an 
account of their mode of existence in the subject; the second explains their rela-
tionship to the world. They are not quasi-substantial objects subsisting in the 
mind of the cognitive agent, capable because of this intimate relation to the mind 
of allowing it to “refer” to absent and distant objects. They are rather activities 
performed by him, although activities of a very special sort. They are intentional 
activities, which contain or present, in a manner proper to the modality of judg-
ment, a part of the world. And so, the judgment “it is raining” is not an inde-
pendent and persistent mental object. Subjectively speaking, the judgment is the 
intentional activity of judging that takes place when the words “it is raining” are 
articulated with understanding; as such, it exists only when the words are actu-
ally being thought. Objectively speaking, and this will prove to be the more 
proper sense of the judgment, the sense that it possesses in ordinary parlance, it 
is a state of affairs, e.g. that “it is raining”, yet not as an articulation of how the 
world actually is, but as a claim or proposal about the world. 
The above understanding of judgments requires as its foundation the princi-
ple of intentionality, which may arguably be held to be the first principle of 
phenomenology, according to which the relationship between the mind and 
known objects is immediate. This principle, or something analogous, is con-
spicuously absent in Kant and other adherents of what may be called the tradi-
tional view concerning judgments. 
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
In his Introduction to Phenomenology, Robert Sokolowski makes the rather bold 
and far-reaching claim that one of the most sophisticated and valuable contribu-
tions of phenomenology to philosophy is its treatment of judgments and mean-
ings.2 In particular, he maintains that it is possible to do away with the view that 
judgments and, more generally, senses are mental entities and serve as interme-
diaries between the mind and things. His position, which has the character of an 
                                                        
1 Due to its general character, the account presented here of necessity involves a significant 
simplification of themes developed by Husserl himself. It is difficult to do justice to the complexity 
of his thought in the short space and limited scope of this essay. I shall follow the interpretation of 
Husserl’s thought presented by Robert Sokolowski in his various works, particularly in his Intro-
duction to Phenomenology (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
2 Introduction to Phenomenology, pp. 98–99. 
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axiom of phenomenology, is that no such mediation is necessary because the 
mind has direct access to the world and to the things in it. This view is an imme-
diate consequence of the principle of intentionality.3 
Kant is probably the single thinker to whom Husserl is most indebted intel-
lectually. As regards the nature of judgment, however, Sokolowski places him in 
opposition to Husserl. He includes Kant among thinkers who hold the “tradi-
tional” view concerning the status of intelligible objects. Kant is not alone in this 
camp; he is accompanied, Sokolowski points out, by as diverse an entourage of 
figures as medieval thinkers – no one is named explicitly – Descartes, and the 
British Empiricists, most notably Hobbes and Locke. In our days, he adds, cog-
nitive scientists and many philosophers of language tend to see judgments in this 
manner.4  
The traditional view is a dynamic picture gallery model of cognition: judg-
ments are mental or conceptual objects, possessing an almost thing-like charac-
ter, and the mind is their container.5 The world and the mind are two fundamen-
tally distinct domains; one contains real material objects, the other is populated 
by mental objects. In the process of sensual cognition mental objects come into 
existence “in” the mind. Once “in” the mind, such objects acquire a life of their 
own; they can, for example, be arbitrarily recombined by the imagination to 
produce new mental objects, which need not “correspond” to anything in the 
“real” world. These cognitive mental objects exist in the mind in a manner 
analogous to that in which material things exist in the world. Ordinary experi-
ence inclines us to regard the material world as a collection of physical objects 
having independent substantial existence. We can turn to particular objects 
whenever we wish. Furthermore, we believe that they do not cease to exist when 
we turn our attention away from them, that they are always there for us to return 
to them. In like fashion, the mind is believed to be a container for judgments. As 
mental objects, they have a quasi-substantial nature. They persist in the mind 
and, even though they tend to fade away with time, they do have a kind of inde-
pendent existence. When we are not exercising judgments, they patiently hang 
in the corridors of our mind, somewhat in the way that pictures hang in a gal-
lery, waiting for us to return to them. 
One troublesome consequence of such an understanding of the mind and 
judgments is the egocentric predicament.6 If a radical distinction is drawn be-
tween the mind and the world, as two separate containers for their respective 
objects, and if mental objects are construed as fundamentally or ontologically 
different – i.e. different in their very being – from those that exist in the world, 
then one can easily be forced into a position that theoretically denies any con-
                                                        
3 John Drummond makes essentially the same point, though his argument differs from that of 
Sokolowski and is formulated in terms of the Husserlian noema. See “An Abstract Consideration: 
De-Ontologizing the Noema”, in The Phenomenology of the Noema, J.J. Drummond and L. Embree 
(eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 89–109. 
4 Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 98. 





nection between the two worlds, even though practice tells us that this cannot be 
right. One is left with an “inside” and an “outside”, without any theoretical ac-
count of how the ontological chasm between them is to be bridged.  
The egocentric predicament, in turn, is only one step away from relativism.7 
If the mind and the world are cut off from one another and if no natural bridge 
can theoretically be show to exist between them, then we are also deprived of an 
account of a community of judgments. Each individual mind is then left with its 
own private judgments.  
Nevertheless, it would seem that at the same time we cannot do without 
judgments as distinct objects of some sort. As Sokolowski points out, the issue 
of truth seems to require the existence of something like judgments as separate 
objects.8 Our common experience of truth and falsity forces us, as it were, to 
speak of a correspondence or agreement between something that is in the mind, 
a judgment, and something that is in the world, a state of affairs. There must 
then be some object in us, and the only possible candidate seems to be the judg-
ment, which corresponds or fails to correspond to worldly states of affairs.  
Yet in spite of the apparent need for judgments, there seem to be serious dif-
ficulties in explaining exactly what they are and how they fulfill their function 
of intermediaries. The judgment understood as a mental entity is a purely theo-
retical postulate. Ordinary experience seems to require it, yet it is not something 
that we ever experience directly. Physical things can be perceived directly and 
thereby described accurately. In a picture gallery, we are aware of moving from 
one actual object to another, and each object can be experienced explicitly as 
a distinct entity. We seem unable to do anything of the sort with judgments: we 
cannot look at a judgment directly and report what we see. Sokolowski gives the 
following vivid expression of the problem: 
And yet, although we seem forced to posit meanings and judgments as men-
tal or conceptual things, such things turn out to be philosophically embarrassing 
and perplexing. We never directly experience them. They are postulated as 
something we cannot do without, but no one has ever seen one of them. They 
are theoretical constructs rather than familiar entities. They are postulated, not 
given, and they are postulated because we think we cannot explain knowledge 
and truth without them. How do they exist? What sort of entities are they? Are 
they in the mind or in some sort of third realm between the mind and the world? 
How do they do their work of referring us to objects? How many of them do we 
have? Do they come into actual existence and then go out of it, moving from 
virtual to actual and back to virtual again, as we call them up? They seem to be 
duplicates of the things and states of affairs outside us; why do we need to posit 
them? But how can we avoid doing so? Propositions and meanings as mental or 
representational entities seem to be a pis aller, a cul de sac, an aporia. We are 
boxed into them by philosophical confusions.9 
                                                        
7 Ibidem, p. 10. 
8 Ibidem, p. 98. 
9 Ibidem. 
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HUSSERL’S PROPOSAL I: INTENTIONAL ACTIVITIES 
How do the ideas developed by Husserl help to clarify what judgments are? The 
main conceptual tool that he introduces is the principle of intentionality. It is 
difficult to overemphasize the philosophical importance of this principle. At the 
same time, it ought to be noted that, precisely because it has the character of 
a principle, it is not susceptible to direct demonstration: it must be introduced 
inductively and its validity can be shown by its success in explaining the phe-
nomena and by the philosophically disastrous consequences of attempts to deny 
it, of which the egocentric predicament is an eminent example.  
According to the principle of intentionality, objects of our awareness are 
available to us directly, without any need for mediating entities. This holds for 
all of the cognitive modalities: external sense perception and its internal variants 
of memory, imagination, and anticipation; it also holds for the intellectual cogni-
tive modalities: simple signitive cognition via words and concepts and, of par-
ticular interest to us, categorial cognition via sentences and judgments.  
In all of the above cases the respective object is available immediately to the 
mind: the perceived object, the remembered, imagined, or anticipated object, the 
simple intelligible object that is signified by a word, and the state of affairs, the 
complex intelligible object that is expressed in a judgment. And so, for example, 
when we are experiencing something visually, it is the seen thing itself that is 
given to us, not its representation, not an impression produced by the real thing, 
which is itself taken to be beyond our perception but somehow causally respon-
sible for it. Turning to the internal sensible modalities, the remembered object is 
not a copy of the sensible object, existing in the mind of the cognitive agent. It is 
not a new object at all; it is the very same object that was given earlier to sense 
experience and is now available through a new modality. The difference be-
tween sensation and recollection is not one of object, but of the manner in which 
one and the same object is given to experience.  
Perception and recollection, then, do not involve an intermediate object be-
tween the mind and the real perceived object or the remembered object. Fur-
thermore, neither of them itself constitutes such a mental object. Perception 
itself is not an entity existing in the mind of the cognitive subject, to which he 
turns when perceiving. Likewise, recollection itself is not a quasi-substantial 
being to which someone turns in remembering. They are both activities through 
which their respective objects are given. To be sure, they are activities of the 
mind and in this sense they inhere in the mind, yet this does not make them 
mental objects and it does not mean that their objects are in the mind. Their 
objects are in the world. The world is precisely the sum or, better, the context of 
what is experienced sensibly and later remembered. Generally speaking, it is the 
world that is the object of those activities.  
When recalling sensible objects, we do not therefore turn to a stored mental 
image of the previously perceived object. The dynamic picture gallery is not an 




of playing a musical instrument. Recollection is the reenactment, in a new mo-
dality, of a previously performed activity, just as a musician reenacts a musical 
piece that he has learned to play. What is stored in the mind, then, is not the per-
ceived object, but the activity of perceiving the object, or the ability to perform 
that activity. In recollection this activity is replayed, as it were, in a new key.  
Intentionality eliminates the need for a Kantian thing-in-itself and turns his 
phenomena into the appearances of real things, given to us directly when we 
experience them sensually. Real things are given to us precisely through their 
appearances. In consequence, there is only one world, the world that we experi-
ence through the external senses. The sensible experience of this world is the 
basis for intellectual cognition, through which the mind recognizes structure in 
what has been perceived.  
The principle of intentionality may now also be applied to judgments. Judg-
ment is analogous to perception and recollection; it too is an activity and it has 
its proper object. The object that is made available through it is the categorial 
object or the state of affairs. Like the sensible object, the state of affairs exists in 
the world: the world consists not only of sensible objects, but also of categorial 
objects. Such an object, however, is not capable of being perceived by the exter-
nal senses, for it is not a sensible object, but is rather a structure that is present in 
sensible objects. Its experience, therefore, requires sensible objects and sense 
perception, but involves an object and a faculty that are distinct from both of 
them. And so, for example, while sensible rain can be perceived and can be 
remembered, the state of affairs “it is raining” cannot.  
As in the case of sense perception and its modal variants, the object of judg-
ment is also available immediately to the mind. When a judgment is carried out 
in the sensible presence of the whole that contains the state of affairs, no internal 
object is created, just as no internal representation or impression comes into 
existence during sense perception. Rather, there takes place the recognition of 
the presence in what is perceived of the structure which is the state of affairs. 
Indeed, judgment in this case is precisely the recognition of the structure. When 
looking outside the window, one has a visual experience and within what one is 
seeing one recognizes the structure “it is raining”. No mental object is at work as 
an intermediary and no such object seems required.  
Furthermore, in addition to the fact that judgment does not involve a third 
entity apart from the cognitive subject (his mind) and the state of affairs in the 
world that is its object, judgment itself is not such a quasi-substantial entity 
abiding in the mind. It is an activity of a cognitive agent through which its ob-
ject, the state of affairs, is given. Like perception and recollection, as an activity 
of the mind it inheres in the mind, but it does not for that reason become a men-
tal object, nor do its objects turn into mental objects. It is an intentional activity 
of the cognitive agent and its objects are in the world, even as they are and con-
tinue to be available only in and through the judgment.  
To use a metaphor, the principle of intentionality applied to judgments 
means that, rather than being internal pictures that give us access to things in the 
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world, judgments are more like windows that open directly upon the world it-
self. Thus, when we carry out the judgment “it is raining” and then go to fetch 
our umbrella, it is the world itself, the fact that it is raining, that is made avail-
able to us. Our attention is turned to a part of the world, not to a mental object 
which we call a judgment and which is to give us access to a world that is oth-
erwise beyond us. No; it is rather the case that the world itself, a part of it, is 
made present to us directly in and through the judgment when we think “it is 
raining”.  
As Sokolowski points out, one of the reasons for postulating judgments as 
mental objects in the first place was the need to account for our ability to think 
about objects, states of affairs, that are absent.10 One case of this is intellectual 
memory. Treating the judgment as an activity makes it possible for the phe-
nomenon of intellectual memory to be accounted for in a manner analogous to 
that in which sensible memory is explained. If recollection in general can be 
understood as the reenactment in a different mode of a previously performed 
intentional activity, then intellectual memory is the ability to carry out a repeti-
tion of a previous activity of judging. The previously experienced state of affairs 
becomes present because the activity carries with it that state of affairs as its 
object. This object, however, is an object in the world, not in the mind, just as in 
the case of a judgment performed in the actual sensible presence of the embod-
ied state of affairs the categorial object is in the world. 
HUSSERL’S PROPOSAL II: STATES OF AFFAIRS AS PROPOSED 
Yet the above account of the judgment is incomplete. It does not represent fully 
what is usually understood by a judgment, for we customarily have in mind not 
so much the subjective aspect, the activity of judging, but the objective one, the 
state of affairs contained in or expressed by it. Furthermore, a judgment ought to 
be capable of possessing logical value, the quality of being either true or false; 
a judgment as an intentional activity is neither true nor false. If, in our search for 
something that might satisfy these requirements, we turn to the object of the 
judgment so characterized, the simple state of affairs in the world, we find that it 
too is not the sort of thing which can be either true or false, for a state of affairs 
is not a semantic object but an ontological one. As such an object, it can at most 
possess ontological truth. 
The phenomenological understanding of a judgment, according to which it is 
a state of affairs as proposed, attempts to remedy the above difficulties and to 
supplement the understanding of judgment as an intentional activity. It is based 
upon a distinction between two attitudes that can be adopted toward a state of 
affairs, the ontic or direct attitude and the apophantic or propositional attitude. In 
                                                        




the former, the state of affairs expressed is accompanied by the conviction or 
belief that it obtains in the world. It is a fact. This happens, for example, when 
we think “it is raining” and go to fetch our umbrella. In the apophantic attitude, 
by contrast, the state of affairs is expressed in a way that in itself is neutral to 
whether it obtains or not. It is here that the judgment as a state of affairs as pro-
posed appears. 
It was in fact the ontic attitude that was the object of our considerations in 
the previous section. Yet it must be emphasized that it contains no judgment in 
the sense that interests us at present. To be sure, there is an activity, but again, 
this is not what is ordinarily meant by a judgment. A judgment such, as some-
thing that can be true or false, is absent. When speaking of a judgment in the 
ordinary sense, one has in mind an object, and the only object present here is the 
state of affairs or the categorial object believed to be in the world. 
In the apophantic attitude a judgment as a semantic object appears. This atti-
tude, however, is not a reflective one and its object must be distinguished from 
one that arises through reflection. In order to make this distinction clearer, how-
ever, it is necessary to consider the nature of an object according to phenome-
nology. 
An important aspect of the principle of intentionality is the understanding of 
an object that it implies. An object is a correlate of an activity of the mind and is 
precisely that toward which the attention of a cognitive agent is explicitly di-
rected. In the ontic attitude attention is directed toward a state of affairs that 
holds in the world; this state of affairs, therefore, is its object and is the only 
object to be found in this attitude. The activity by means of which this takes 
place indeed exists, but it is not strictly speaking an object in the above sense, 
for it is not itself that toward which attention is directed. It is rather the very 
directing of attention. 
A judgment as an object of reflection becomes present through an additional 
and distinct activity of objectification, which takes place when attention is turned 
explicitly to the activity of judging. This is, for example, what took place in the 
previous section, when we described and analyzed judgment philosophically. Yet 
in such a reflective attitude the object of the analyzed judgment is no longer our 
immediate object. It is not present to us directly and explicitly. Entering the philo-
sophical attitude involves a shift of attention from a state of affairs in the world to 
the activity by means of which that state of affairs is given. Now insofar as every 
cognitive activity is intentional and therefore necessarily involves its proper ob-
ject, turning to the activity of judging does not entail a complete turning away 
from the object of that activity. The state of affairs continues to be implicitly pres-
ent in the objectified judgment as its inseparable part. 
The above reflective attitude, however, differs from the propositional or apo-
phantic attitude as Husserl understands it. The latter involves a different shift of 
attention which makes present a judgment in the ordinary semantic sense, as 
something which explicitly involves a state of affairs and yet admits of verifica-
tion and hence of being true or false. 
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The nature of the shift of attitude that gives rise to a judgment as a state of 
affairs as proposed may best be seen by considering an illustration.11 Let us 
return to the situation in which our colleague has told us that it is raining. In-
stead of immediately entering the ontic attitude – or perhaps shortly after having 
entered it – in which we simply and naively go along with what we have been 
told and think that it is indeed raining, we might notice something that makes us 
pause: let us suppose our colleague tells us that he has been outside, but we note 
that his shoes are not wet, or suppose something in what he says does not add up 
and leads us to think that he might be mistaken, or suppose we find that some-
thing in his behavior that inclines us to suspect that he is deceiving us or simply 
trying to pull our leg. Our next thought might be “but is it really raining?” At 
this moment our attitude toward the state of affairs changes. The same state of 
affairs, “it is raining”, is still present to us in the sense that our attention is di-
rected toward it, but the belief that it obtains has been suspended. We have not 
yet judged the contrary, that it is not raining: we are in a state of uncertainty, 
intermediate between belief and disbelief. What was earlier taken to be a state of 
affairs in the world – in principle capable of being experienced directly – is now 
taken to be merely what someone says or claims about the world. More gener-
ally, removing the reference to an actual or potential speaker, it can be said to be 
simply what is proposed. We have then a claim, a proposal: i.e. a proposition.  
The difference between the two attitudes can also be seen in the difference 
between the following two enuntiations of a cognitive agent: 
(1) “It is raining” 
(2) “‘It is raining’ is true” 
In (1) we have a judgment in the sense of an activity of judging, that is, of 
the directing of the mind to a categorial object. One who says or thinks (1) with-
out additional qualifications believes that it is in fact raining. No judgment as an 
object is present. In (2) we also have a judgment in the sense of an activity of 
judging, of saying something about something: that A is true, where A stands for 
“it is raining”. Yet the “it is raining” in the second statement differs from that in 
the first. One who has finished saying the word “raining” in the second sentence, 
in spite of material identity of what has been articulated, has said something 
different from his counterpart who has finished saying sentence (1). The “it is 
raining” in the second sentence is not accompanied on the part of the one who 
articulates it by the conviction that it is in fact raining. Indeed, it is precisely this 
lack of belief that makes it possible for the addition of “is true” to make any 
sense at all. Yet this means that the “it is raining” in the second sentence is 
a different sort of thing than in the first. Phenomenology maintains that it is 
a judgment in the sense of a state of affairs as proposed, in which the relation-
ship to a concrete empirical object has been nullified internally, and can there-
fore be attributed to it externally. It contains and expresses a state of affairs, but 
                                                        
11 The illustration presented here is adaptation of an example provided by Sokolowski. See In-




does not include a commitment regarding whether the same state of affairs can 
be encountered in an actual and particular empirical object. 
Unlike the shift between the ontic attitude and the attitude that reflects upon 
it, the shift between the ontic and the apophantic attitude does not involve 
a change of object. In the former case, the two attitudes involve two objects; the 
first is the state of affairs, the second is the activity of being cognitively directed 
to that state of affairs. The ontic and apophantic attitudes, however, possess the 
same object, a given state of affairs. The difference between them lies precisely 
in the attitude that is taken toward the state of affairs.  
Now a state of affairs or a categorial object is an object of the understanding. 
Such an object is the structure of a complex empirical or sensible object. It is 
therefore taken by default, as it were, to be the structure of an actual empirical 
object, i.e. one that is being experienced or can be experienced: the ontic attitude 
is the one that is spontaneously adopted. However, the structure as such, as 
a form, does not require the existence of an actual empirical object in order to 
maintain its identity as an object of the understanding. It can be grasped by the 
mind even in the absence of such an object. The sentence “it is raining”, there-
fore, taken in its default mode, means that it is actually raining, that the state of 
affairs presented by it actually obtains and can be experienced empirically. Yet 
the structure that it presents, “it is raining”, is available to the mind, i.e. is capa-
ble of being understood, regardless of whether it obtains or not. In the ontic 
attitude, the state of affairs is taken as presenting a reality; a categorial structure 
or form is presented precisely as the form of an empirical object. By contrast, in 
the apophantic attitude, the same state of affairs is seen as presenting only an 
intelligible appearance, a categorial form in detachment from any particular 
empirical object. And this is what a judgment is, a state of affairs taken as just 
appearance. 
CONCLUSION 
Let us consider finally how Husserl’s proposal might resolve the difficulties 
present in the traditional understanding of the judgment. As regards their rela-
tionship to the mind, judgments are not mental entities that represent the world 
external to the mind. They are not like images in a picture gallery. If we insist 
upon employing a simile, they are more like windows that open directly upon 
the world. Even this comparison is limited, though its utility consists chiefly in 
underlining the fact that judgments give direct and original access to the world. 
They are not derivative forms of cognition that make available a state of affairs 
that is better experienced in some more fundamental way. The judgment is the 
only way to have access to states of affairs. The comparison fails in that a win-
dow also suggests an entity. More accurately, a judgment is rather an intentional 
activity, which, precisely because it is intentional, presents and in a sense con-
tains the categorial object or state of affairs. 
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The above remarks apply to both the ontic and the apophantic attitudes. In 
both we are dealing with intentional activities inhering in the mind of the cogni-
tive agent. The distinction between these two attitudes makes it possible to un-
derstand the judgment in an objective sense. The intentional direction toward an 
object in the ontic attitude is accompanied by a belief, the conviction that the 
object actually exists. This conviction can be put out of action; when this takes 
place, we enter the apophantic attitude, in which the state of affairs is given as 
a claim, proposal, or proposition, as something with which we do not identify, 
though we do understand it. This understanding, or rather the understood object, 
without identification or conviction, is what the judgment is. 
The above account of judgment is especially attractive because of the expla-
nation of truth that follows from it. Truth does not have to be explained as 
a philosophically embarrassing correspondence, as Sokolowski puts it, between 
two heterogeneous objects, between a mental entity whose nature is by no 
means clear and a physical state of things in the world. Instead, the correspon-
dence is between two states of affairs, between a state of affairs that is presented 
or proposed in a judgment – without conviction or belief regarding its reality – 
and a state of affairs in the world – the one that one turns to empirically when 
going to the thing itself about which the judgment purportedly is in order to 
verify it. The comparison or correspondence in this case is homogeneous, for it 
takes place between two objects of the same sort, two states of affairs: one that 
is given directly to sense experience and another that is supposed, proposed, or 
claimed to be exist and hence to be capable of being experience sensually. 
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